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11 Introduction
Estimating labor supply elasticities on the extensive (labor market participation) and
intensive margin (working hours) using a discrete rather than a continuous speci¯cation
has become increasingly popular in the last years. The main advantage of the discrete
choice approach compared to a continuous speci¯cation derives from the possibility to
model nonlinearities in the budget function of a household. Most of the discrete choice
literature is based on cross sectional data and focusses on static labor supply models. Yet,
the assumption of static labor supply behavior has been rejected by numerous studies that
¯nd strong evidence for genuine state dependence in the labor supply behavior, an early
example is Heckman (1981a). The contribution of this paper is to link the discrete choice
labor supply framework with research on intertemporal labor supply behavior. The main
focus of this study is the analysis of genuine state dependence and of the dynamics of
labor supply behavior of married women on the extensive and the intensive margin.
There exist several studies on the labor supply behavior of women in an intertemporal
setting, e.g. Hyslop (1999). Of particular interest for this paper are those few studies
that focus on both the extensive and the intensive margin of labor supply. Prowse (2005)
analyzes transitions of women between no work, part-time and full-time work in an in-
tertemporal context. Using a multinomial probit model, she shows that genuine state
dependence is present in both full-time and part-time employment. In a similar intertem-
poral framework as employed in this study, Michaud and Vermeulen (2004) model the
labor supply and retirement decision of households in the US. To the best of my knowl-
edge, for Germany, this is the ¯rst study of labor supply behavior on both the intensive and
extensive margin in an intertemporal discrete choice setting. A recent study on Germany
by Croda and Kyriazidou (2005) focusses on the labor market participation of married
women based on data from the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). The authors employ sev-
eral panel data estimators with ¯xed and random e®ects. Regardless of their speci¯cation,
they ¯nd strong state dependence of married women on the extensive margin.
This study extends previous work in several dimensions. First of all the focus is not
only on the extensive but as well on the intensive margin. Although labor supply e®ects on
the extensive margin tend to be more important (Heckman, 1993), it is necessary to study
the intensive margin as well when analyzing the labor supply behavior. This is in particular
important for the evaluation of welfare programs such as the EITC in the US, WFTC in
the UK or the Mini-job reform in Germany, as these reforms provide opposite incentives
for the labor market participation and the working hours (Steiner and Wrohlich, 2005).
Further, the analysis is based on a detailed microsimulation model for Germany (STSM)
2which maps the relevant regulations of the German tax and bene¯t system and accounts
for child care costs. The striking advantage of microsimulation is that the work incentives
of individuals can be accurately described in the household context. For the analysis of
the female working behavior controlling for child care costs is very important as the labor
supply of married women is in particular a®ected by child care costs. In this respect this
analysis goes beyond most of the previous studies. Furthermore, I model the labor supply
of both spouses in a joint utility model where the partners jointly maximize a household
utility function. Thus, labor supply of the partner is not exogenously given but explicitly
modeled within the framework. The intertemporal discrete choice approach allows to
study the dynamics of labor supply. Labor supply elasticities in the short and long term
can be derived. This yields important insights for the evaluation of policy reforms as not
only the size of the labor supply e®ects of a given reform but also about the process of
behavioral adjustment can be derived.
Based on data from the SOEP, I estimate the intertemporal discrete choice model for
married women in Germany for the period 1999-2002. In the econometric analysis, I em-
ploy a dynamic conditional logit panel data model with random e®ects where the choice of
discrete labor supply alternatives is estimated conditional on the labor supply of the last
period, on individual and alternative speci¯c variables and on unobserved heterogeneity.
Unobserved heterogeneity is modeled nonparametrically (Heckman and Singer, 1984). It
is necessary to control for unobserved heterogeneity in order to disentangle true and spu-
rious state dependence. The problem of initial conditions is explicitly taken into account.
I follow Wooldridge (2005) and specify a model for the unobserved individual e®ect condi-
tional on time constant individual covariates and the initial state. In the empirical analysis
I test for genuine state dependence in labor supply behavior on the extensive and the in-
tensive margin and derive labor supply elasticities on both margins. Using the Markov
chain property, I distinguish between the adjustment of labor supply in the short and the
long run. My empirical ¯ndings are in line with previous studies indicating that genuine
state dependence is signi¯cantly present in the labor supply behavior of married women. I
show that state dependence is high at the extensive margin, yet modest or non existing on
the intensive margin. This result drives the dynamics of labor supply elasticities. In the
short run, labor supply elasticities are negligible. In the long run, however, the in°uence
of state dependence is relaxed and hence the behavioral adjustment markedly increases.
Di®erentiated by groups, my ¯ndings indicate that women with low participation rates,
such as women with young children or women living in the western part of Germany have
the highest state dependence.
32 Theoretical Background
Intertemporal Discrete Choice Model
Discrete choice models of labor supply are based on the assumption that a household i is
faced with a ¯nite number J of discrete bundles of leisure and net household income which
provide di®erent levels of utility Vj at period t. In this model I assume that households do
not save, thus consumption equals the net disposable income. I follow previous studies,
e.g. van Soest (1995) or Blundell, Duncan, McCrae, and Meghir (2000) and model the
labor supply decision of couples in a joint framework, by de¯ning a joint utility function
with combinations of discrete working hours of both spouses and the resulting disposable
household income.1 In a static discrete labor supply approach the utility is only condi-
tioned on information of the present period t. To model the dynamics of labor supply,
I introduce state dependence of labor supply by conditioning the utility in period t on
the lagged labor market status of both spouses in period t ¡ 1. Note, the intertemporal
framework proposed here does not describe the labor supply behavior over the full life
cycle. The agents are assumed to be myopic in the sense that they do only incorporate
their past employment history yet not the future working behavior when maximizing their
utility in the current period. In this respect, the model is similar to the intertemporal
framework of labor market participation with structural state dependence developed by
Heckman (1981c).
Vijt = U(lfijt;lmijt;yijt;zit¡1;xit;ci;²ijt): (1)
The utility function of a household U contains an observable and an unobservable
component. The observable component includes the leisure time of both spouses, lfijt
and lmijt, and the net household income yijt. Further, individual, household and time
speci¯c characteristics of both spouses that are constant over the di®erent labor supply
alternatives, such as age or nationality (xit) enter the utility function. These variables can
be interpreted as taste shifters of the preferences. In addition, the utility is dependent
on the realized working hours alternative of the previous period zit¡1. This variable is
1In contrast to previous work on household labor supply, such as the recent work by Michaud and
Vermeulen (2004), I do not consider a collective model where both spouses are involved in a bargaining
process to determine their individual leisure and income. Based on the available information in the data
strong assumptions about the bargaining process had to be imposed (Beblo, Beninger, and Laisney, 2003).
Therefore, I stick to the joint utility model which lacks this °exibility but has been proven to be well
identi¯ed and robust, e.g. van Soest (1995), Blundell, Duncan, McCrae, and Meghir (2000), or Haan and
Steiner (2005).
4constant over the alternatives and a®ects the preferences for leisure and income in the
current period. The unobservable component consists of a household speci¯c term ci =
(cim;cif) that is allowed to vary for the spouses and of an random error term that varies
over time, households and alternatives ²ijt. In this framework, the decision rule of a
household has the following form: both spouses maximize jointly a household utility given
the combination of both partners` leisure time and the household income and they choose
the bundle j that provides the highest utility for the household in period t.
According to the empirical distribution of female and male working hours,2 13 discrete
bundles (J = 13) of household income and female and male leisure hours are de¯ned
(Table 2). The maximization problem of the household is subject to a budget constraint
as net household income depends on the working hours of the spouses, i.e the non-leisure
time. The discrete choice model is driven by the probabilities to choose each alternative J.
Given these probabilities, the optimal supply of weekly working hours can be determined
as the sum of discrete working hours weighted by their probabilities. Due to changes in a
household`s budget function or due to changes of observed or unobserved characteristics
that de¯ne the utility it might become optimal for the household to adjust labor supply
over time. In a static model it is assumed that a household can adjust labor supply
immediately. This assumption, however, is only justi¯ed if state dependence does not
exists.
State Dependence in Labor Supply
State dependence in labor supply is present if, given the observed and unobserved charac-
teristics, the working behavior of the last period a®ects the current labor supply decision.
This could arise if the employment history is relevant for prices, preferences and constraints
of future periods (Prowse, 2005). Intertemporally nonseparable preferences, human cap-
ital accumulation, or signalling and scarring e®ects explain why the current utility for
leisure and income is a®ected by the previous employment history. Further, ¯xed costs of
work such as search or transaction costs are potential sources of state dependence, as these
might di®er by the previous employment state Hyslop (1999) or Prowse (2005). In the
empirical analysis I will distinguish between child care costs which is the major ¯nancial
burden for women with small children and other ¯xed costs of work. Child care costs are
explicitly accounted for in the estimation and thus they are not part of potential state
dependence. This is important when comparing the state dependence of women with and
2Figure 1 shows the weekly working hours for women and men. The ¯gures underline the discrete
distribution of working hours.
5without small children.
State dependence can be positive or negative, yet as underlined by the given examples,
the correlation of labor supply over time seems to be positive (Lee and Tae, 2005). In the
empirical application, I will test whether the e®ect of genuine state dependence is positively
signi¯cant in a model of labor supply. Therefore, I will distinguish between two sources
of choice persistence: genuine state dependence and unobserved heterogeneity. Next to
genuine state dependence and unobserved heterogeneity, there might be a third source of
choice persistence in the data coming from autocorrelation in the error terms ²ijt. Amongst
others, Hyslop (1999) accounts for serial correlation. Yet, Croda and Kyriazidou (2005)
and Michaud and Tatsiramos (2005) reject the hypothesis of a ¯rst order autoregressive
process in a dynamic labor supply model using micro data for Germany. Therefore, I
assume ²ij1, ..., ²ijT to be uncorrelated over time.
Before discussing the data in more detail in the next section, a look at descriptive
statistics of working transitions provides evidence of persistence in female labor supply,
stemming either from unobserved or observed heterogeneity or genuine state dependence
(Table 1).
[Table 1: about here]
On the diagonal, the persistence of labor supply can be seen. During the time of
observation, 1999 ¡ 2002 the German tax and transfer system was a®ected by important
reforms, the major one being the tax reform 2000. As Haan and Steiner (2005) show, this
reform had an important impact on the net disposable income of households. In addition,
changes in other variables a®ecting the preference for work, such as age or children, could
lead to transitions in labor supply states. However, the diagonal shows a high persistence
in the labor supply of women.
Note, in this study I do not di®erentiate between voluntary and involuntary unemploy-
ment, thus all women choose their hours points voluntarily without facing labor demand
side restrictions. This addresses a general shortcoming of the labor supply literature.
Following Blundell, Ham, and Meghir (1987), there have been several attempts to intro-
duce involuntary unemployment into a structural labor supply model (Duncan and Mac-
Crae, 1999) or (Bargain, Caliendo, Haan, and Orsini, 2005). Bargain, Caliendo, Haan, and
Orsini (2005) derive labor supply elasticities with and without labor market constraints
using the same data as employed in this study, and they ¯nd that elasticities accounting
for involuntary unemployment are signi¯cantly lower for singles and men living in cou-
ples, yet not signi¯cantly di®erent for women in couples. This is because the majority
of the inactive married women chooses voluntarily not to work. Thus, the assumption
6of a pure choice model for this group is not too restrictive even in a country with high
unemployment rates such as Germany.
3 Data Organization
In order to empirically analyze the above derived intertemporal model of labor supply it
is necessary to employ panel data information of households. This study is based on the
SOEP which is a representative sample of over 12 000 households living in Germany with
detailed information about socio-economic variables on a yearly basis.3 For this analysis,
I draw on a balanced panel for the years 1999 - 2002. I concentrate on married couples
where both spouses are aged between 20 and 55 years. Excluded are households where at
least one spouse is in full-time education, self employed or retired, because labor supply of
these groups di®er from the rest of the population. After dropping households with miss-
ing information 1 647 households remain which are observed over four periods. The ¯rst
period is required to construct the initial state of labor supply. Thus, information of three
periods enters the estimation proving variation over time and between the alternatives. As
described above, the working alternatives are de¯ned according to the empirical distribu-
tion of working hours of the population; in each alternatives the average of working hours
within the given alternative are assigned to the households (Haan and Steiner, 2005).
[Table 2: about here]
The ¯rst three columns in Table 2 yield information about the working alternatives
and the percentage of households choosing these categories. In Germany, part-time work
for men is very unusual. Therefore, the choice set for the male spouse is simply no work,
full-time and over-time. Women can choose between inactivity, two part-time categories,
full-time and over-time. Dropping two unusual combinations, where the woman is working
part time and the man is not working, 13 discrete choices of working hours have been
de¯ned. As expected, in this sample, the male labor market participation is far higher
than the participation of women. Whereas nearly 95% of all men supply positive working
hours, only about 75% of the women participate on the labor market.4 Part-time work is
very common for married women. More than 40% of the female population works part-
time. Interestingly, that holds not true for the eastern part of Germany which can be seen
3For a detailed description of the data set, see Haisken De-New and Frick (2003).
4These participation rates exceed the participation rates of the whole working population as I focus on
an age group with relatively high participation rates.
7in the last column. This, and the higher female participation rate in east Germany point
at the still very di®erent labor market behavior in east and west Germany.
In column (4), the average disposable net household income in each alternative is
tabulated. The net household income is derived on basis of the microsimulation model
STSM (Steiner, Haan, and Wrohlich, 2005). The simulation model maps the German tax
and transfer system in detail. Based on variables drawn from the SOEP that determine
gross income and bene¯ts for all household members, disposable net income is simulated at
the household level. The largest share of gross income being working income is calculated
on basis of the alternative speci¯c working hours and a constant hourly gross wage.5
The detailed modeling of the net household income is in particular important for the
estimation of labor supply e®ect as this is the most accurate way to describe the work
incentives (Laroque and Salanie, 2002). Actual child care costs are very high in Germany.
This is due to the limited number of subsidized child care facilities (Wrohlich, 2006). For
this analysis the actual child care costs for households with children younger then 6 years
have been imputed.6 The child care costs are subtracted from the simulated net household
income for the relevant households.
Comparing the net household income over the alternatives, it becomes obvious that
due to non labor market income and due to the tax and bene¯t system in Germany
the di®erence between the income in the categories is relatively moderate. Note, as in
Germany, income is jointly taxed with full income splitting, additional hours of the spouse
of a full-time working partner do only modestly a®ect the net disposable household income.
This is due to the high marginal tax rates which the secondary earner faces in a married
household (Steiner and Wrohlich, 2004).
Households` preferences for income and leisure might di®er by individual and house-
hold speci¯c characteristics such as age, region or the number of children. As the literature
has shown, in particular the number of young children is important for labor supply of
women. In Table 3 the share of households with children of a certain age group by hours
categories is listed. These statistics provide strong evidence that women with young chil-
dren do not work. In the last column the expected child care costs for household with
children younger than 6 years are shown. Following Wrohlich (2006) I distinguish between
part-time and full-time care and assign the costs to those alternatives where both spouses
are working dependent whether the wife is working full-time, over-time or part-time.
5For non working individuals hourly wages are estimated on basis of a Heckman selection model. For
the speci¯cation and the results of the wage estimation, see Steiner, Haan, and Wrohlich (2005).
6Child care costs are estimated based on individual and regional information. They di®er by age of the
child. I thank Katharina for providing the data.
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Table 4 provides information about all individual and household speci¯c variables em-
ployed in the estimations.
[Table 4: about here]
4 Econometric Speci¯cation
Initial Conditions Problem
In the following, I will develop the econometric model and discuss the estimation procedure
in detail. As described in equation (1), the utility in period t is conditioned on the lagged
dependent variable zit¡1. This leads to the problem of initial conditions when estimating
the model because the initial working alternative of an individual cannot be assumed to
be random. This is a general problem of a dynamic speci¯cation which has been widely
discussed in the econometric literature. In numerous empirical applications the initial
conditions problem is tackled by modeling the initial state following the method suggested
by Heckman (1981b). Lee and Tae (2005) and Croda and Kyriazidou (2005) follow a
di®erent approach: they employ a dynamic conditional logit model with ¯xed e®ects,
developed by Honore and Kyriazidou (2000). The advantage of this approach is that the
unobserved heterogeneity ci is removed such that no assumptions about the endogeneity
of the unobserved e®ects have to be imposed. As in this approach ci drops out the initial
conditions problem does not arise. However, this °exibility has several drawbacks one of
them being that partial e®ects are not identi¯ed which is crucial to determine the amount
of state dependence (Wooldridge, 2005).
In order to solve the problem of initial conditions, I employ another estimation strat-
egy that builds on the approach suggested by Chamberlain (1980) and Wooldridge (2005).
This approach has been applied in similar studies, such as Michaud and Vermeulen (2004),
Michaud and Tatsiramos (2005) or Lee and Tae (2005). It is based on the assumption that
the conditional expectation of the unobserved household e®ect h(cijzi0;xi;±) is correctly
speci¯ed, conditional on the initial state zi0 and on household and individual speci¯c vari-
ables that are constant over time (xi). In other words, the assumption implies that there
exists a linear projection of exogenous variables, the initial state zi0 and further observed
9individual variables (xi) and an error term ai that explains the unobserved individual ef-
fect. Vector (xi) includes the mean values of all individual and household speci¯c variables,
age, number and age of children, health status, region and nationality.7 The unobserved
household speci¯c error term ai captures the remaining unobserved heterogeneity that is
by de¯nition uncorrelated with zi0 and (xi). In the estimation I allow ai to be di®erent for
both spouses, ai = (aim;aif) and model potential correlation. Inserting the model of the
unobserved household speci¯c e®ect ci into the above de¯ned utility function, the utility
of alternative j becomes:
Vijt = U(lfijt;lmijt;yijt;zit¡1;xit;ci(zi0;xi;ai);²ijt): (2)
Drawing on McFadden (1974), I assume the error terms ²ijt to follow a Gumble dis-
tribution. Then, a dynamic conditional logit model can be derived where the probability
of choosing alternative j from all J alternatives conditional on the explanatory variables
in period t, the chosen alternative of the previous period and the unobserved individual
e®ect has the following form:






The household speci¯c error term ai = (aim;aif) is speci¯ed nonparametrically following
Heckman and Singer (1984). I assume that the household speci¯c error term is described
by a bivariate discrete distribution with two points of support (mass points) for hus-
band (am1;am2) and wife (af1;af2).8 Hence, the household speci¯c e®ect is described by
four combinations of the male and female heterogeneity points, G: (am1;af1), (am1;af2),
(am2;af1) and (am2;af2), which are assumed to be constant for all households. For each
of these combinations there exists a probability having these values of unobserved het-
erogeneity. This speci¯cation is °exible as it captures the correlation of the spouses`
characteristics which are not observed. Note, for identi¯cation, only one mass point for
each spouse is freely estimated; the other point is normalized to zero. The probabilities
¼k, k 2 f1;2;3;4g for the four combinations follow a multinomial distribution:
7This approach slightly di®ers from Wooldridge (2005) as means of the explanatory variables rather
than the values at all points in time are included.








¼k = 1 (4)
where qk are the transformed probability coe±cients to be estimated. For identi¯cation
q1 is normalized to zero. Mass points and the transformed probabilities are jointly esti-
mated with the parameters by maximum likelihood.9 Standard errors for the probabilities











Pr(Yit = j)ditj; (5)
where ditj = 1 if j is the chosen alternative and 0 otherwise. In the conditional logit
framework variables which do not vary over alternatives, are not identi¯ed. Therefore,
variables that are constant over alternatives (xit;xi) including the lagged dependent vari-
able zit¡1 and the initial state zi0 enter the speci¯cation as taste shifters of the preferences
for income and leisure. State dependence is modeled in linear and quadratic terms of
both spouses' leisure time in the previous period. The initial state enters in a similar way.
The household speci¯c error term is included in a °exible way as random coe±cient of
the leisure terms of both partners allowing for correlation of unobservable characteristics
shifting the taste for the spouses' leisure time.
Speci¯cation of the Utility Function
For the speci¯cation of the utility function, I assume a quadratic utility function similar
to Blundell, Duncan, McCrae, and Meghir (2000). Disposable net household income and
the leisure of both spouses, their interaction and their quadratic terms enter the utility
function. Hence, the utility function to be estimated has the following form:




+®7ylfijt + ®8ylmijt + ®9lmlfijt:
I assume that the marginal utility of income and leisure varies across households by
age, education, number and age of children, region, health status, nationality, the lagged
dependent variable, the initial state and the random e®ect:
®1 = ¯1 + °1x1it; (7)
9The model is estimated using the -ml- command in Stata version 8.2.
11®2 = ¯2 + °2x2it + afj; j 2 f1;2g; (8)
®3 = ¯3 + °3x3it + amj; j 2 f1;2g; (9)
where af1 and am1 are normalized to zero. The lagged dependent variable, the initial
state and the mean values of all time varying characteristics are included in vectors (x1it)
and (x2it) and enter the speci¯cation through the net household income and through the
female leisure term. The previous employment state is de¯ned as the realized leisure time
in the previous period and enters in linear and quadratic terms.10 To capture the disutility
related to °exible arrangements, I follow van Soest (1995) and include dummy variables
for the part time categories of women in vector (x1it).
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Estimation Results
Table 5 contains the estimation results for the dynamic conditional logit panel data model
with and without random e®ects. Both, the mass points and the probabilities are sig-
ni¯cant at the 5% level. This, and the Akaike Information Criterion11 indicate that it is
necessary to include random e®ects to control for unobserved individual e®ects. There-
fore, for the following interpretation, I focus only on the model including random e®ects.
However, despite of the signi¯cant di®erence, the coe±cients are very similar in both spec-
i¯cations. This ¯nding is in line with Michaud and Vermeulen (2004) who argue that the
initial state captures most of the individual unobserved heterogeneity.
Preference for income and leisure vary with observed characteristics, such as education,
number of children, age or region.12 As expected, the presence of young children signi¯-
cantly increases preference for leisure of women. In line with previous studies, women and
men living in East Germany, and non German spouses prefer to work more. Education
10More °exible speci¯cations for the state dependence with vectors of dummy variables do not change
the results of this analysis.
11The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) rather than a standard likelihood ratio test has to be consid-
ered as under the null hypothesis the latter violates the regularity conditions, and thus its distribution is
unknown. AIC is de¯ned as AIC = lnL ¡ k, where lnL is the log likelihood at the maximum and k the
number of estimated parameters.
12As Wooldridge (2005) points out, e®ects of time constant variables such as education or the mean
values of time variant explanatory variables cannot be identi¯es as they are partially correlated with the
unobserved heterogeneity ci.
12seems to increase the taste for work. This e®ect is signi¯cant for men yet not for women.
Taste shifters related to age are not always signi¯cant and do not display clear patterns.
Men with a poor health status have a higher preference for leisure while for women this
e®ect is not signi¯cant. Part time dummies are signi¯cantly negative; as stressed above
this captures the disutility related to °exible arrangements.
The coe±cients of the lagged dependent variables hint at positive state dependence in
the labor supply behavior of women. Leisure time of the women in the previous period
signi¯cantly increases the taste for leisure in the current period, yet at a decreasing rate
as the quadratic term of the previous leisure term has a negative e®ect. The e®ect of the
lagged leisure term of the male spouse on the wife`s preference for leisure is very small
and only weakly signi¯cant. The lagged leisure term of the man signi¯cantly reduces
the preference for income in the current period which supports the hypothesis of state
dependence. For the woman, this e®ect points in the same direction yet is not statistically
signi¯cant. I have excluded potential e®ects of state dependence on the male labor supply
as the focus of this paper is solely on female labor supply behavior.
For the interpretation of e®ects with multiple interactions, such as income and leisure,
marginal e®ects, derivatives or elasticities need to be considered. Empirical derivatives
with respect to leisure and income show that the theoretical implications of the utility
function are ful¯lled. For almost all households the concavity of the utility with respect to
income is guaranteed. The derivatives with respect to leisure show that for a small part of
the population an increase in leisure diminishes the utility; this result is line with previous
studies and does not contradict the theoretical implications of the model (Euwals and van
Soest, 1999).
5.2 Genuine State Dependence on the Extensive and Intensive Margin
In the following I will test the hypothesis of positive state dependence in female labor
supply.
Posterior Probability of Discrete Alternatives
In order to derive the household speci¯c probabilities for each working category it is nec-
essary to draw on the posterior probability that is conditioned on the choice sequence of
a household. This conditional probability explicitly accounts for the unobserved hetero-
geneity by assigning unobserved characteristics to each household (Skrondal and Rabe-
Hesketh, 2004). I adapt the method described in Train (2003) who shows how to calculate
posterior probabilities assuming a continuous parametric distribution. I derive the pos-
13terior probabilities by calculating household speci¯c weights for the four di®erent mass








where vector (~ yik) captures the chosen sequence of working alternatives conditioned
on mass point combination k and matrix Xi that includes all explanatory variables over
the observed period. The higher the probability of the chosen sequence given the mass
point combination the higher the weight assigned to the combination. Skrondal and Rabe-
Hesketh (2004) provide a detailed description about this method sometimes referred to as
Empirical Bayes and discuss the properties of the prediction.
Conditioned on the estimated coe±cients of the lagged dependent variable, I describe
the transition process of labor supply by calculating a transition matrix M. In the columns
of the transition matrix the previous employment state is tabled, the rows show the choice
of the working alternative in the current period. The transition matrix provides informa-
tion about genuine state dependence as unobserved and observed characteristics are kept
constant within each column except the lagged dependent variable. That implies all dif-
ferences in the labor supply behavior conditioned on period t¡1 can be attributed to the
previous employment status which is state dependence.13 The estimated state dependance
is simply the di®erence in the probability within an column.
[Table 6 : about here]
The elements in the transition matrices are the average one-period transition proba-
bilities summing over all women independent of their observed working behavior in period
t¡1. Standard errors of the probabilities have been estimated following Gong, van Soest,
and Villagomez (2004) by repeating the simulation of the transition matrix for 100 draws
from the estimated distribution of the parameter estimates. The estimated transition ma-
trix clearly supports the hypothesis of state dependence on the extensive margin. The
probability of inactivity in the current period conditional on not working in the period
before is about 40%. For a woman who had been working in the last period this proba-
bility is according to the standard errors signi¯cantly lower. The di®erence increases with
the number of working hours. For a full-time working woman the probability of inactivity
in the next period is about 6% which is 34 percentage points lower; for a woman working
over-time the di®erence amounts to more than 36 percentage points. For a woman who
had been working part-time the di®erence in the probability not to work in the current
13Uhlendor® (2006) applies a similar approach when testing for state dependence in income dynamics.
14period relative to the same average women who had been inactive, is lower, yet still impor-
tant and signi¯cant. These ¯ndings are in line with the results of Prowse (2005); on the
extensive margin she ¯nds a higher level of genuine state dependence for full-time workers
than for those in part-time work.
In contrast to previous studies on state dependence in the labor supply behavior of
women, the method suggested here allows to analyze state dependence not only on the ex-
tensive but as well on the intensive margin, that is the impact of last period`s employment
on the number of hours worked. Comparing the choice probabilities on the intensive mar-
gin conditional on last period`s employment, the picture is not clear cut. In most cases,
the impact of the previous working behavior is not signi¯cant. This is in particular true
when comparing choices conditional on neighboring employment states, such as full-time
work vs. over-time work in the last period. The potential sources of state dependence,
named above, explain the di®erences in the persistence between the extensive and the
intensive margin. Fixed costs of work or other sources why the previous working history
might a®ect preferences of the current labor supply, are more important on the extensive
margin. Yet, with the similarity of the working alternatives the impact of these sources is
decreasing.
Genuine State Dependence by Region and Age of Children
As discussed above, the working behavior of women di®ers with respect to several observed
characteristics. In the German context, heterogeneity is mainly explained by di®erences
between east and west Germany and di®erences between household with and without
young children. Therefore, it is of interest not only to analyze the transition behavior
and state dependence of the mean married women but as well di®erentiated by region and
family status.
[Table 7 : about here]
As found in Table 2, the main di®erence between east and west German women is the
higher labor market participation in the East and the di®erent attitude towards part-time
work. These di®erences can be mainly explained with the di®erent historical background
in both parts of Germany and with the better child care facilities for young children in
the eastern part. For both, east and west German women, state dependence is highly
signi¯cant and positive on the extensive margin though at a di®erent level and of di®erent
size. Whereas in east Germany the state dependence between full-time work and inactivity
amounts to about 0.23 percentage points, for west Germany the comparable state depen-
dence is close to 0.36. This result supports the ¯nding of Michaud and Tatsiramos (2005)
15who show that South European countries with low labor market participation of women
experience a higher state dependence than women in countries with higher participation
rates, such as France or the UK. Turning to the intensive margin, again the e®ect of state
dependence is either insigni¯cant or ambiguous in both sub samples.
[Table 8 : about here]
The labor market participation of women with young children is very low in Germany,
in particular for those with children younger than 3 years. One important reason for this is
the low provision of subsidized child care facilities and the therefore high opportunity costs
of women with young children (Wrohlich, 2006). Yet, as I have explicitly controlled for
child care costs in the estimation, di®erences in the transition behavior of women with and
without young children can not be related to di®erent ¯xed costs of work due to children.
State dependence on the extensive margin between the three groups, women with a child
younger than three, a child between 3 and 6 years and without children or with children
older than 6 exhibits the expected pattern. Yet compared to the very di®erent labor
market behavior - very low participation for women with children younger than 3 - the
di®erence in state dependence between full-time and inactivity seems relatively modest. It
varies from 33 percentage points for women without young children to about 42 percentage
points for women with children between 3 and 6 years. The comparable state dependence
for women with children younger than three is 38 percentage points. The same holds for
the state dependence on the intensive margin. Between the three groups there are strong
di®erences in the working behavior of the women participating on the labor market - if
women with children younger than three work, they tend to choose the part-time categories
whereas women without young children work more full-time and over-time. However, the
state dependence on the intensive margin is either not statistically present or very similar
between the groups.
5.3 The Dynamics of Labor Supply Behavior
To analyze the implication of state dependence for the labor supply behavior of women,
I derive labor supply elasticities over time and analyze the dynamics of these elasticities.
This analysis provides information to what extent state dependence leads to di®erent
adjustment mechanism over time given a change in the net household income. If state
dependence is strongly positive, it needs several periods to adjust labor supply. In contrast,
if state dependence is only weakly present or non existent, changes in the net household
income a®ect labor supply immediately or in the short run.
16Dynamic Labor Supply Elasticities using First Order Markov Process
As labor supply elasticities cannot be derived analytically within the employed discrete
choice framework, I simulate the impact of an exogenous change of female gross hourly
wage on her labor supply decision numerically. The elasticities are derived by calculating
the simulated change in the predicted hours of work and in the participation rates induced
by a 1% change in gross hourly wages. For the prediction of the working hours and the
participation rate, I derive transition matrices under two di®erent scenarios, the status
quo and a simulated scenario that di®ers by a 1% higher hourly wage. Given the transition
matrix and assuming a ¯rst order Markov transition process, I calculate transition matrices
for future periods. The advantage of this procedure is that stochastic transition matrices
conditional on the previous labor market status can be simply derived not only for period
t but as well for future periods t + k. Technically this is done by taking the power with
degree t+k of the transition matrix Mt+k, where t describes the period of interest. Hence,
the transitions matrix after the second period is simply the square of the transition matrix
of the ¯rst period, after period 3 the polynomial of the transition matrix to the power of
three has to be calculated, and so on. The transition probabilities provide information
about the average number of working hours and the average labor market participation
rate at the end of each period. The average number of hours is calculated by taking the
expected value of the working hours given the transition probabilities and the mean hours
in the di®erent working categories which are listed in Table 2. The participation rate is
simply de¯ned as the probability of working. Given the average number of working hours
and the average participation rate in the status quo and assuming a 1% increase of gross
hourly wages, it is straightforward to derive labor supply elasticities after each period. The
labor supply elasticity in terms of hours of work is simply the relative change in working
hours. Note, the elasticities presented here can not be directly compared to net wage
elasticities derived in previous studies. Gross wage elasticities include both, the impact of
the tax and bene¯t system as well as the pure behavioral e®ect. Further, the elasticities
with respect to participation and hours of work can not be compared as extensive versus
intensive elasticities as the working hours elasticity is an unconditional elasticity including
both the intensive and extensive margin. I focus on this de¯nition of elasticities because
these are the elasticities derived in previous static discrete choice models, see e.g. van
Soest (1995), or Haan and Steiner (2005).
Elasticities derived after the ¯rst period are de¯ned as the short term elasticities.
A Markov process converges in the long run. Formally, the steady state is reached if
t ! 1: Empirically, the steady state is reached if a further period does not a®ect the
17transition matrix and the labor supply elasticities converge i.e. if they do not di®er
signi¯cantly. Before turning to the interpretation of the elasticities, it is necessary to
discuss the assumptions underlining a ¯rst order Markov process. As stressed above, the
Markov process allows to predict transitions for future periods. This is possible as a time
constant transition process is assumed. In other words, it is assumed that individuals
adjust their labor supply in each period with a constant rate. This certainly is a strong
assumption, as it is ambiguous how the adjustment process behaves over time. In order to
relax this assumption a higher order Markov process could be considered which remains
for future work.
Short and Long Run Labor Elasticities
Table 9 contains the labor supply elasticities for all women, and separated by region and
family status. Next to the average elasticities, bootstrapped values of the 5th and 95th
percentiles are reported to perform signi¯cance tests.
[Table 9 : about here]
Elasticities are considered as being signi¯cantly di®erent if the con¯dence intervals of
the elasticities to compare do not overlap. The labor supply elasticities both in terms
of participation and in terms of working hours are increasing over time for all groups.
According to the bootstrapped con¯dence intervals this increase is signi¯cant between
the ¯rst and the second period for all women and for most of the sub groups. Between
the ¯rst and the second period elasticities markedly increase, nearly doubling in terms
of participation and in terms of working hours they increase on average by more than
50%. After the second period elasticities still increase but only relatively modest, and
elasticities do not signi¯cantly di®er between the second and the third period. Thus,
these results imply that in the third period the new steady state is reached. Compared to
the short run, in the long run the elasticities with respect to participation and hours of
work approximately double. The di®erences between the short and the long run can be
related to state dependence. In the short run, state dependence prevents the women to
fully adjust their labor supply. However, in the long run state dependence is circumvent
and thus, the labor supply can be fully adjusted to the new optimal working behavior.
The size and the dynamics of labor supply elasticities varies by groups. In line with
previous ¯ndings about the labor supply behavior of German women, women living in
west Germany and women with young children have the highest labor supply response.
186 Conclusion
In this paper I have developed an intertemporal discrete choice model of labor supply
for married women. This model combines and extends previous studies by introducing
state dependence in a structural discrete choice labor supply model that allows to study
the extensive and the intensive margin of labor supply. Hence, behavioral changes of
women over time with respect to labor market participation and working hours can be
analyzed. The results of the empirical analysis support the hypothesis of positive state
dependence in the choice of labor supply on the extensive margin. On the intensive margin
state dependence is only modest or non existent. This is due to the fact that the impact
of potential sources of state dependence, such as ¯xed cost, decrease with the similarity
of the working behavior between two periods. Within the intertemporal model labor
supply elasticities over time can be derived. Di®erentiated by groups the ¯ndings show
that women with low labor market participation, namely women with young children and
women living in west Germany, have the highest state dependence. I ¯nd that due to state
dependence labor supply elasticities di®er signi¯cantly between the short and the long run.
State dependence prevents to immediately adjust the labor supply in the short run, yet in
the third period the long run elasticity is reached and women have fully adjusted to their
new optimal working behavior.
This study is not only interesting from a methodological point of view but as well for
the evaluation of policy reforms. Employing this intertemporal framework it is possible
to asses the short and long term labor supply e®ects of policy changes. In addition to the
size of the labor supply e®ects this model can provide information about the process of
adjustment of the labor supply behavior.
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238 Tables
Table 1: Persistence in the employment of women
Inactivity Part-time work 1 Part-time work 2 Full-time work Over-time work All women ( t)
Inactivity 1,019 95 59 63 17 1,253
Part-time work 1 127 460 89 7 5 688
Part-time work 2 79 121 1,203 86 11 1,500
Full-time work 35 11 84 894 129 1,153
Over-time work 6 3 20 125 193 347
All women ( t+1) 1,266 690 1,455 1,175 355 4,941
The following working hours classi¯cations (weekly) for women are used: 0, 0-24, 25-34, 35-40, >40.
Source: SOEP, wave 1999-2003
Table 2: Working hour categories
alternative Share Hours Women Hours men Net income East-Germany
% per week per week in Euro %
1 2.45 0 0 1280.45 42.15
2 1.52 19 0 1720.44 34.67
3 2.15 40 0 2166.73 40.57
4 13.56 0 37 2438.14 13.13
5 8.76 9.5 37 2672.49 4.85
6 17.69 24 37 2968.59 14.87
7 13.90 37 37 3205.27 36.39
8 3.46 45 37 3396.06 48.54
9 9.35 0 48 2845.57 16.23
10 5.16 9.5 48 3082.55 5.49
11 11.15 24 48 3386.72 20.15
12 7.29 37 48 3596.94 50.00
13 3.56 45 48 3794.72 46.59
The following working hours (weekly) classi¯cations are used: men: 0, 0-40,
>40; women: 0, 0-24, 25-34, 35-40, >40.
The overall share of households in east Germany is about 20%.
Net household income (monthly) is calculated on basis of the microsimulation
model STSM. The net household income is the mean income in the given alter-
native.
Source: SOEP, wave 1999-2003, STSM
24Table 3: Children by working hour categories
alternative Hours Women Hours men child 0-3 child 3-6 Child Care Cost
per week per week % % in Euro
1 0 0 13.22 22.31 0
2 19 0 2.67 10.67 0
3 40 0 6.60 11.32 0
4 0 37 16.87 18.96 0
5 9.5 37 5.54 17.78 214
6 24 37 2.06 8.81 214
7 37 37 0.29 5.09 614
8 45 37 1.17 3.51 614
9 0 48 19.05 25.76 0
10 9.5 48 7.45 11.37 214
11 24 48 2.90 10.89 214
12 37 48 0.56 4.17 614
13 45 48 1.14 5.11 614
The following hours classi¯cations are used: men: 0, 0-40, >40; women: 0, 0-24,
25-34, 35-40, >40.
Share of households with at least one child in the given age interval.
Child care costs are expected monthly child care costs for households with children
younger than 6 (Wrohlich, 2006).
Source: SOEP, wave 1999-2003
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics by Year
Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std.
Year 2000 2001 2002
Monthly net household income in Euro 2944 1017 3101 1190 3162 1213
Age of the husband 41.92 6.84 42.93 6.84 43.93 6.83
Age of the wife 39.87 6.85 40.87 6.85 41.87 6.86
Husband is German 0.89 0.31 0.90 0.31 0.90 0.30
Wife is German 0.89 0.31 0.90 0.30 0.90 0.30
No degree (husband) 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.14
Medium degree (husband) 0.78 0.42 0.78 0.42 0.78 0.42
High degree (husband) 0.20 0.40 0.20 0.40 0.20 0.40
No degree (wife) 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.13
Medium degree (wife) 0.83 0.37 0.83 0.37 0.83 0.37
High degree (wife) 0.15 0.36 0.15 0.36 0.15 0.36
Health status of husband
1 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.11 0.02 0.12
Health status of wife
1 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.10
Couple living in East Germany 0.23 0.42 0.23 0.42 0.23 0.42
Household with child younger 3 years 0.07 0.26 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.23
Household with child between 3 and 6 years 0.16 0.37 0.13 0.33 0.08 0.27
Weekly working hours of husband in period t 39.94 10.23 38.69 10.97 37.63 12.12
Weekly working hours of husband in period t-1 39.13 10.47 39.94 10.23 38.69 10.97
Weekly working hours of husband in the initial state
2 39.13 10.47 39.13 10.47 39.13 10.47
Weekly working hours of wife in period t 20.62 15.64 20.28 15.25 20.27 15.10
Weekly working hours of wife in period t-1 20.32 15.38 20.62 15.64 20.28 15.25
Weekly working hours of wife in the initial state
2 20.32 15.38 20.32 15.38 20.32 15.38
Observations 1647 1647 1647
1)Percentage of people who are with 100% disabled.
2)Initial state is the working behavior in the year 1999
Source: SOEP, wave 1999-2003 and STSM
25Table 5: Estimation Results
Coef. Std. Coef. Std.
Net Income
Age - Man -38.089 12.571 -36.557 15.277
Age2 - Man 46.904 14.486 45.608 17.549
Age - Woman 17.661 9.493 18.269 12.165
Age2 - Woman -21.350 11.369 -22.318 14.565
Leisure t-1 - Man -0.085 0.006 -0.051 0.006
Leisure t-1 - Woman -0.011 0.006 -0.007 0.007
Leisure t-0 - Man -0.050 0.005 -0.058 0.007
Leisure t-0 - Woman -0.007 0.006 -0.012 0.007
Constant 11.474 2.444 10.876 3.109
Net Income2 -0.085 0.023 -0.138 0.031
Leisure Man
Age - Man 0.111 0.467 0.071 0.542
Age2 - Man 1.088 0.403 1.180 0.496
German - Man -0.007 0.024 0.001 0.026
East German - Man -0.014 0.069 -0.016 0.087
Health Status - Man -0.006 0.034 0.002 0.036
Medium Education Degree - Man -0.024 0.007 -0.030 0.009
High Education Degree - Man -0.048 0.009 -0.048 0.011
Age - Man -0.009 0.003 -0.009 0.003
Health Status - Man 0.023 0.036 0.009 0.039
German - Man -0.003 0.024 -0.008 0.026
East German - Man 0.023 0.070 0.032 0.088
Constant 0.438 0.071 0.413 0.095
Leisure Man2 -0.003 0.000 -0.004 0.000
Leisure Woman
Age - Woman -0.281 0.456 -0.204 0.549
Age2 - Woman 0.601 0.403 0.368 0.514
German - Woman -0.038 0.039 -0.044 0.041
East German - Woman -0.152 0.114 -0.168 0.127
Health Status -Woman -0.063 0.047 -0.077 0.051
Child 0-3 0.122 0.019 0.142 0.021
Child 3-6 0.013 0.011 0.022 0.012
Medium Education Degree - Woman -0.005 0.014 -0.002 0.017
High Education Degree - Woman -0.028 0.015 -0.026 0.018
Leisure t-1 - Man -0.002 0.001 -0.002 0.001
Leisure t-1 - Woman 0.012 0.001 0.006 0.002
Leisure2 t-1 - Man 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001
Leisure2 t-1 - Woman -0.004 0.001 -0.001 0.001
Leisure t-0 - Man -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000
Leisure t-0 - Woman 0.004 0.000 0.005 0.000
Age - Woman 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.003
Child 0-3 0.029 0.022 0.074 0.025
Child 3-6 -0.027 0.013 -0.035 0.015
Health Status - Woman 0.095 0.052 0.129 0.059
German - Woman 0.032 0.039 0.040 0.042
East German - Woman 0.145 0.114 0.161 0.127
Constant 0.303 0.080 0.451 0.103
Leisure Woman2 -0.007 0.000 -0.008 0.000
Net Income*Leisure Man 0.006 0.003 -0.001 0.004
Net Income*Leisure Woman 0.008 0.002 0.006 0.003
Leisure Man*Leisure Woman 0.095 0.152 -0.152 0.169
Part Time 1 -1.261 0.075 -1.288 0.081
Part Time 2 -0.617 0.079 -0.727 0.086
Mass point - Woman -0.210 0.016








Uy > 0 95% 95%
Ulf > 0 70% 70%
Ulm > 0 95% 75%
Time dummies for the year 2001 and 2002 have been included.
Variables in italic are the individual mean values.
Unobserved heterogeneity is assumed to follow a non parametric distribution. For
both, men and women 1 mass points is freely estimated. Probabilities p2-p4 are
estimated, p1 is derived following the underlining assumption
PM
m=1 Pi(am
i ) = 1.
To guarantee plausible results a multinomial speci¯cation of the probabilities, rather
than the probabilities p2-p4, has been estimated. The standard errors of the proba-
bilities are derived using the delta method.
Source: SOEP, wave 1999-2003 and STSM
26Table 6: Transition Matrix of Women: all Women
Inactivity (t) Part-time work 1 (t) Part-time work 2 (t) Full-time work (t) Over-time work (t)
Inactivity (t-1) 0.403 0.266 0.288 0.040 0.002
0.014 0.011 0.015 0.006 0.001
Part-time work 1 (t-1) 0.293 0.245 0.374 0.082 0.006
0.008 0.010 0.008 0.007 0.001
Part-time work 2 (t-1) 0.154 0.184 0.453 0.185 0.024
0.010 0.006 0.014 0.007 0.002
Full-time work (t-1) 0.065 0.104 0.444 0.319 0.067
0.008 0.010 0.010 0.013 0.005
Over-time work (t-1) 0.039 0.067 0.400 0.388 0.106
0.007 0.010 0.012 0.020 0.009
The following hours classi¯cations are used: 0, 0-24, 25-34, 35-40, >40.
Standard errors are given in italic. Standard errors are derived using bootstrapping with 100 replications.
Source: SOEP, wave 1999 -2003
Table 7: Transition Matrix of Women: by region
Inactivity (t) Part-time work 1 (t) Part-time work 2 (t) Full-time work (t) Over-time work (t)
West Germany
Inactivity (t-1) 0.448 0.272 0.249 0.030 0.002
0.016 0.010 0.014 0.005 0.000
Part-time work 1 (t-1) 0.332 0.260 0.341 0.062 0.005
0.009 0.010 0.009 0.006 0.001
Part-time work 2 (t-1) 0.179 0.203 0.448 0.151 0.018
0.010 0.008 0.015 0.006 0.002
Full-time work (t-1) 0.078 0.119 0.469 0.280 0.054
0.010 0.011 0.012 0.013 0.004
Over-time work (t-1) 0.048 0.078 0.433 0.354 0.088
0.009 0.013 0.013 0.021 0.010
East Germany
Inactivity (t-1) 0.256 0.246 0.417 0.077 0.005
0.015 0.014 0.015 0.012 0.001
Part-time work 1 (t-1) 0.171 0.193 0.476 0.146 0.013
0.009 0.010 0.011 0.015 0.002
Part-time work 2 (t-1) 0.080 0.123 0.458 0.295 0.045
0.007 0.006 0.016 0.013 0.005
Full-time work (t-1) 0.026 0.063 0.358 0.437 0.115
0.005 0.007 0.011 0.013 0.009
Over-time work (t-1) 0.012 0.038 0.292 0.486 0.172
0.004 0.008 0.014 0.015 0.014
The following hours classi¯cations are used: 0, 0-24, 25-34, 35-40, >40.
Standard errors are given in italic. Standard errors are derived using bootstrapping with 100 replications.
Source: SOEP, wave 1999 -2003
27Table 8: Transition Matrix of Women: by family status
Inactivity (t) Part-time work 1 (t) Part-time work 2 (t) Full-time work (t) Over-time work (t)
Household without young children
Inactivity (t-1) 0.350 0.278 0.322 0.047 0.003
0.015 0.012 0.015 0.007 0.001
Part-time work 1 (t-1) 0.239 0.247 0.411 0.094 0.008
0.009 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.001
Part-time work 2 (t-1) 0.107 0.174 0.479 0.211 0.028
0.008 0.007 0.016 0.009 0.003
Full-time work (t-1) 0.032 0.090 0.446 0.355 0.077
0.006 0.011 0.011 0.014 0.005
Over-time work (t-1) 0.014 0.053 0.388 0.426 0.119
0.004 0.011 0.016 0.021 0.011
Household with children younger 3 years
Inactivity (t-1) 0.874 0.105 0.021 0.000 0.000
0.013 0.010 0.005 0.000 0.000
Part-time work 1 (t-1) 0.811 0.140 0.048 0.001 0.000
0.018 0.011 0.009 0.001 0.000
Part-time work 2 (t-1) 0.672 0.189 0.131 0.008 0.000
0.027 0.014 0.017 0.002 0.000
Full-time work (t-1) 0.493 0.215 0.261 0.028 0.002
0.041 0.015 0.029 0.005 0.001
Over-time work (t-1) 0.389 0.214 0.341 0.050 0.006
0.053 0.014 0.039 0.010 0.002
Household with children between 3 and 6 years
Inactivity (t-1) 0.590 0.238 0.156 0.015 0.001
0.018 0.009 0.013 0.003 0.000
Part-time work 1 (t-1) 0.479 0.253 0.232 0.033 0.003
0.018 0.009 0.013 0.005 0.001
Part-time work 2 (t-1) 0.305 0.238 0.363 0.085 0.010
0.021 0.009 0.020 0.007 0.001
Full-time work (t-1) 0.165 0.169 0.466 0.169 0.030
0.020 0.015 0.021 0.014 0.004
Over-time work (t-1) 0.115 0.126 0.482 0.227 0.051
0.020 0.017 0.015 0.024 0.007
The following hours classi¯cations are used: 0, 0-24, 25-34, 35-40, >40.
Standard errors are given in italic. Standard errors are derived using bootstrapping with 100 replications.
Source: SOEP, wave 1999-2003
28Table 9: Labor Supply Elasticities by Region and Family Status
Period All Women West Germany East Germany No young child Children 0-3 Children 3-6
Labor Market Participation
1 0.0332 0.0351 0.0278 0.0287 0.1807 0.0326
(0.0269 - 0.0390) (0.0290 - 0.0405) (0.0227 - 0.0347) (0.0225 - 0.0339) (0.1291 - 0.2328) (0.0232 - 0.0433)
2 0.0564 0.0638 0.0355 0.0464 0.3281 0.0640
(0.0460 - 0.0655) (0.0534 - 0.0736) (0.0291 - 0.0430) (0.0377 - 0.0554) (0.2111 - 0.3806) (0.0414 - 0.0878)
3 0.0681 0.0784 0.0385 0.0555 0.3343 0.0757
(0.0548 - 0.0800) (0.0663 - 0.0905) (0.0312 - 0.0463) (0.0444 - 0.0673) (0.2114 - 0.3719) (0.0456 - 0.1054)
4 0.0732 0.0848 0.0397 0.0597 0.3246 0.0786
(0.0584 - 0.0868) (0.0720 - 0.0980) (0.0318 - 0.0476) (0.0472 - 0.0731) (0.2062 - 0.3573) (0.0460 - 0.1092)
5 0.0754 0.0874 0.0401 0.0616 0.3234 0.0791
(0.0599 - 0.0898) (0.0744 - 0.1011) (0.0320 - 0.0481) (0.0483 - 0.0758) (0.2045 - 0.3528) (0.0457 - 0.1093)
Working Hours
1 0.0921 0.0969 0.0799 0.0868 0.2334 0.0868
(0.0751 - 0.1087) (0.0790 - 0.1150) (0.0637 - 0.0969) (0.0718 - 0.1028) (0.1642 - 0.3018) (0.0613 - 0.1147)
2 0.1419 0.1541 0.1085 0.1304 0.4197 0.1385
(0.1161 - 0.1636) (0.1264 - 0.1830) (0.0842 - 0.1311) (0.1050 - 0.1536) (0.3099 - 0.5559) (0.0908 - 0.1731)
3 0.1650 0.1812 0.1187 0.1503 0.4258 0.1577
(0.1350 - 0.1869) (0.1487 - 0.2152) (0.0905 - 0.1429) (0.1188 - 0.1765) (0.3260 - 0.5501) (0.0986 - 0.1881)
4 0.1750 0.1928 0.1224 0.1592 0.4107 0.1630
(0.1430 - 0.1963) (0.1581 - 0.2290) (0.0924 - 0.1470) (0.1243 - 0.1867) (0.3165 - 0.5252) (0.0996 - 0.1894)
5 0.1793 0.1976 0.1237 0.1631 0.4057 0.1641
(0.1464 - 0.1999) (0.1619 - 0.2346) (0.0929 - 0.1484) (0.1266 - 0.1911) (0.3125 - 0.5182) (0.0994 - 0.1886)
The 5th and 95th percentiles are given in brackets they are derived using bootstrapping with 100 replications.
Source: SOEP, wave 1999-2003
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